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THE LADIES? FORGET ABOUT THEM. A 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE LIMITS 
OF ORIGINALISM 
Mary Anne Case∗ 
One hundred years ago, in An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution of the United States, Charles Beard asked of the 
Framers: 
Did they represent distinct groups whose economic interests 
they understood and felt in concrete, definite form through 
their own personal experience with identical property rights, or 
were they working merely under the guidance of abstract 
principles of political science?1 
Beard examined the Framers’ investments in, among other 
things, public securities, western lands, shipping and 
manufactures,2 but he did not consider in any detail the possible 
influence of their personal experience as members of the distinct 
group of males who had an economic interest, through the laws of 
coverture, in the labor and property of the women in their 
families.3 Yet the Framers of both the original Constitution and 
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Human Rights; and the University of Virginia Miller Center Symposium to Mark the 100th 
Anniversary of Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. A version 
was presented at the NYU Legal History Colloquium. I am grateful to the organizers of 
these events, particularly Jessica Lowe and Bill Nelson, for their invitation and advice; to 
commentator Ted White; fellow panelists John Harrison and Keith Whittington; my editor 
Dale Carpenter, Will Baude, Dick Fallon, Dirk Hartog, Daniel Hulsebosch, Andy 
Koppelman, Pnina Lahav, Amy Dru Stanley, and Lea VanderVelde for comments on 
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 1. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 73 (1913). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Had he considered their economic interest as males, Beard would have been able 
to raise even above his estimate of “five sixths” the “overwhelming majority of members 
431 
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the post-Civil War Amendments were quite conscious of their 
interests in preserving their male prerogatives in law. Repeatedly 
and explicitly asked, as John Adams was by his wife Abigail, to 
“[r]emember the ladies . . . in the new Code of Laws which I 
suppose it will be necessary for you to make, . . . and be more 
generous and favourable to them than your ancestors,”4 the 
Framers deliberately rejected the demand that they “not put such 
unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands.”5 Asked to 
“[r]emember, all Men would be tyrants if they could,”6 they did 
not simply forget about the ladies; they specifically and 
intentionally determined to exclude them and to confirm men’s 
tyrannical power.7 But, far from acknowledging this as a naked 
power grab, they could claim to justify women’s exclusion “under 
the guidance of abstract principles of political science.” In 
particular, they could rely on a notion, common in the eighteenth 
century, that it would upset the balance of power to give women, 
who already were in a position to exert powerful indirect 
influence on and through their men from within the household, a 
more direct voice in public affairs. As Abigail Adams described 
this view, “It would be bad policy to grant us greater power say 
they since under all the disadvantages we Labour we have the 
as[c]endancy over their Hearts [a]nd. . .by submitting sway.”8 
Thus, the disenfranchisement of women could be characterized as 
a principled decision about the allocation of power and the locus 
at which power is exercised in the same way as might, for example, 
the construction of the Senate, federalism, or the separation of 
[who were] immediately, directly, and personally interested in the outcome of their labors 
at Philadelphia, and were to a greater or less extent economic beneficiaries from the 
adoption of the Constitution.” Id. at 149. 
 4. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), in THE BOOK OF 
ABIGAIL AND JOHN, SELECTED LETTERS OF THE ADAMS FAMILY 1762-1784, at 121 (L.H. 
Butterfield et al. eds., 1975). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. More than the Adams correspondence demonstrates that it is “not anachronistic” 
to consider that the Framers “explicitly denied . . . women entry into the new political 
regime.” See, e.g., LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: 
WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 9 (1998) (quoting James Otis asking if 
“all were reduced to a state of nature . . . had not apple women and orange girls as good a 
right to give their respectable suffrage for a new King as the philosopher . . . ?”). And other 
reasons than John Adams’s, discussed infra, were given for excluding them. See, e.g., Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (Sept. 5, 1816), as quoted in United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532, n.5 (“Were our State a pure democracy . . . there would yet be 
excluded from their deliberations . . . women, who, to prevent depravation of morals and 
ambiguity of issue, could not mix promiscuously in the public meetings of men.”). 
 8. Letter from Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, (Apr. 27, 1776), (available at 
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ADMS-04-01-02-0257) (summarizing John 
Adams’s response to Abigail’s letter insisting that the ladies be remembered).  
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powers, each of which also could be seen to serve sectarian 
interests. 
My article will consider the offered justifications in their 
historical context and some possible responses to them. Like 
Beard’s history itself, “[t]he following pages are frankly 
fragmentary. They are designed to suggest new lines of . . . 
research rather than to treat the subject in an exhaustive 
fashion.”9 But my motive for wanting to take up this project at this 
time has less to do with Beard and the past than with my concerns 
about the constitutional future of sex discrimination10 at a time 
when voices as seemingly disparate as Justice Antonin Scalia11 and 
Roberta Kaplan, attorney for DOMA plaintiff Edith Windsor,12 
disparage the need for heightened scrutiny for sex discrimination 
without taking any account of women’s specifically intended 
historical exclusion and its lingering after-effects. The article will 
therefore conclude with an examination of the limits of 
originalism, not only for women and their rights, but for 
constitutional adjudication more generally. 
 9. BEARD, supra note 1, at v. This essay is also fragmentary in another sense—it 
cannot pretend to do justice to the volumes of primary and secondary sources that have 
already cogently addressed the limitations of the Constitution and its Framers when it 
comes to issues concerning women and sex equality, although it will cite a far from 
exhaustive subset of such works. 
 10. As Barack Obama put it in a different context, “I didn’t come here to debate the 
past. I came here to deal with the future.” Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Alexei Barrionuevo, 
Obama Says U.S. Will Pursue Thaw With Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009. 
 11. See infra note 65. 
 12. In her oral argument before the Second Circuit in United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675 (2013), Kaplan observed, “we believe that . . . being gay or lesbian is closest to 
being an African American than it is to being – I hate to get so personal about this, than 
being a woman, because there is nothing about being gay or lesbian that has anything to 
do with an individual’s ability to perform in society and that’s essentially what I believe the 
courts are looking at, that’s the first factor, I believe it is the most important factor. 
Whereas, for women, and I’m obviously a member of that class, there are obviously things, 
we get pregnant, we are not as strong, there is the firemen cases things like that, where 
there could be some kind of differentiation by the legislature that would make sense. With 
respect to gay and lesbian people, it is very hard if not impossible to conceive of any such 
differentiation.” In context, ironically, Kaplan’s repudiation of constitutional anti-
stereotyping doctrine for sex-based classifications did not serve her client’s cause well, 
because it allowed Second Circuit Chief Judge Jacobs immediately to point out that gays 
and lesbians in same-sex couples could indeed be viewed as differently situated with 
respect to their ability to procreate. Cert. petition in United States v. Windsor, 2012 U.S. 
Briefs 59493 at *a26.  
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THE TYRANNY OF MEN VS. THE DESPOTISM OF THE 
PETTICOAT 
When Beard does discuss women, he lumps them together 
with slaves, indentured servants, and propertyless men among 
“the disfranchised” who were “not represented in the Convention 
that drafted the Constitution except under the theory that 
representation has no relation to voting.”13 Yet the evidence he 
presents as to the sources of the Framers’ wealth suggests that a 
considerable number of them had married heiresses or stemmed 
from families whose wealth was traceable chiefly from the 
maternal line.14 This alone would give these Framers a direct 
personal incentive to “insist upon retaining an absolute power 
over Wives”15 and their property, despite Abigail Adams’s desires 
 13. BEARD, supra note 1, at 24. 
 14. See id. at 75-76 (“Richard Bassett, of Delaware . . . was the adopted son of Mr. 
Lawson, a lawyer, who married a Miss Inzer. The Inzer family was . . . heir to Bohemia 
Manor. . . . Mr. Bassett was educated and trained for the profession of law by Mr. Lawson, 
whose heir he became. By this inheritance he came into possession of six thousand acres 
of Bohemia manor.”); id. at 82-83 (“George Clymer, of Pennsylvania, was the son of ‘a 
well-to-do merchant and ship builder of Philadelphia’ who had augmented his fortunes by 
marrying the daughter of a fellow merchant of the same city. . . . Clymer’s personal fortune 
was further enhanced by a happy marriage to Elizabeth Meredith, the daughter of Reese 
Meredith, ‘one of the principal merchants of Philadelphia.’”); id. at 87 (Had John 
Dickinson’s “personal fortunes . . . not been sufficient . . ., his marriage into one of the first 
and wealthiest commercial families would have more than made up for his deficiencies. In 
1770 he married Mary Norris, and for a time lived at the family estate, Fairhill, one of the 
show places of the day.”); id. at 88-90 (“Though [Oliver Ellsworth] was almost briefless 
during the early days of his practice, he had the good fortune to wed the daughter of 
William Wolcott, of East Windsor, ‘a gentleman of substance and distinction.’”); id. at 91 
(Thomas Fitzsimons “married the daughter of Robert Meade, and established business 
relations with his brother-in-law ‘who was one of the prominent merchants and shipowners 
of Philadelphia.’”); id. at 117 (William Samuel Johnson “added to his own patrimony by 
marrying the daughter of a ‘wealthy gentleman’ of Stratford.”); id. at 119 (“Rufus King 
was also fortunate in his marriage . . . . his wife ‘was the only child of Mr. John Alsop, a 
very respectable and eminent merchant in [New York]’”); id. at 124 (William Livingston 
“married Miss French, ‘whose father had been a large proprietor of land in New Jersey.’”); 
id. at 127 (George Mason “married the daughter of a Maryland merchant, from whom a 
large estate came into his family.”); id. at 148 (George Wythe’s “second wife ‘was a lady of 
a wealthy and respectable family of Taliafero, residing near Williamsburg.’”). As Mary 
Ritter Beard points out, Blackstone, whose exaggerated description of wives’ legal 
subjection to husbands was eagerly embraced by Americans, also profited from family ties 
to wealthy women. See MARY RITTER BEARD, WOMAN AS FORCE IN HISTORY: A STUDY 
IN TRADITIONS AND REALITIES 91 (1946) (describing Blackstone as a tradesman’s son 
whose mother and wife were from the landed gentry, through which family connections he 
obtained a legal education and a country seat to house him when he failed at law practice). 
 15. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (May 7, 1776), in THE BOOK OF 
ABIGAIL AND JOHN, supra note 4, at 127 (“I can not say that I think you are very generous 
to the Ladies, for whilst you are proclaiming peace and good will to Men, Emancipating 
all Nations, you insist upon retaining an absolute power over Wives”).  
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to the contrary.16 Abigail observed of John’s unwillingness to 
“[e]stablish. . . some Laws in [women’s] favour upon just and 
Liberal principals” what Beard documented with respect to the 
Framers more generally: “I have . . . been making trial of the 
Disintresstedness of his Virtue, and when weighd in the balance 
have found it wanting.”17 
Like Beard, John Adams, in his response to Abigail, lumps 
women with the rest of the disenfranchised: 
As to your extraordinary Code of Laws, I cannot but laugh. We 
have been told that our Struggle has loosened the bonds of 
Government every where. That Children and Apprentices 
were disobedient—that schools and Colleges were grown 
turbulent—that Indians slighted their Guardians and Negroes 
grew insolent to their Masters. But your Letter was the first 
Intimation that another Tribe more numerous and powerfull 
than all the rest, were grown discontented.—This is rather too 
coarse a Compliment, but you are so saucy, I wont blot it out. 
Depend upon it, We know better than to repeal our Masculine 
systems. Altho they are in full Force, you know they are little 
more than Theory. We dare not exert our Power in its full 
Latitude. We are obliged to go fair, and softly, and in Practice 
you know We are the subjects. We have only the Name of 
Masters, and rather than give up this, which would compleatly 
subject Us to the Despotism of the Peticoat, I hope General 
Washington, and all our brave Heroes would fight.18 
For John Adams to equate discontented women with insolent 
Negroes might suggest to a modern audience that the decision not 
“to repeal our masculine systems” is no more than a naked power 
grab by what Abigail Adams called a “sex naturally tyrannical.”19 
But, in the late eighteenth century, his expressed concern about a 
 16. Abigail never ceased to press John on this score. Years after first asking him to 
“remember the Ladies,” she wrote, “Even in the freeest countrys our property is subject 
to the controul and disposal of our partners, to whom the Laws have given a soverign 
Authority. Deprived of a voice in Legislation, obliged to submit to those Laws which are 
imposed upon us, is it not sufficient to make us indifferent to the publick Welfare?” Letter 
from Abigail Adams to John Adams (June 17, 1782), in 4 ADAMS FAMILY 
CORRESPONDENCE 328 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1973). 
 17. Letter from Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, supra note 8. 
 18. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776), in THE BOOK OF 
ABIGAIL AND JOHN, supra note 4, at 122-23. Laughter was an all too common response to 
women’s rights claims. See Mary Anne Case, From the Mirror of Reason to the Measure of 
Justice, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 115 (1993) (situating in historical context the laughter that 
greeted Representative Smith’s introduction of a prohibition against sex discrimination 
into the text of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
 19. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams, supra note 4, at 121 (“That your Sex 
are Naturally Tyrannical is a Truth so thoroughly established as to admit of no dispute”).  
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possible “Despotism of the Peticoat” would have resonated 
instead with concerns about the separation of and balance of 
powers between men and women and between their respective 
spheres.20 As Mary Beth Norton describes it, the term “Petticoat 
Government,” used as the title of a 1702 pamphlet by John 
Dunton, editor of the Athenian Mercury, on the accession of 
Queen Anne to the British throne, originates in a time of 
transition from mid-seventeenth century Anglo-America, when 
“high social status rather than gender identified the appropriate 
wielders of power in both household and state,”21 to the pre-
revolutionary eighteenth century, which increasingly defined all 
women out of public life into a private sphere. “Dunton began by 
praising women in general, denying any sexual difference in minds 
or souls,”22 but went on to endorse rigidly separate spheres, with 
a man’s province being the “out of doors” or public sphere and 
that of a woman who was not a hereditary monarch being “the 
Discreet and Housewifely Ruling of a House” where “her very 
Husband lives under Petticoat-Government.”23 
It was the French rather than the American revolutionaries 
who were most alive to the risk of the “despotism of the 
petticoat.” The sentiment that politically powerful women did 
more harm than good was well-nigh universal in a country with a 
vivid memory of inept female regents (from the two Medicis to 
Anne of Austria), interfering royal mistresses (from Maintenon 
and Pompadour to DuBarry, who was guillotined for her crimes), 
ambitious court intriguantes (from the frondières to the Comtesse 
de Polignac) and a network of intellectuals, artists and officials 
entirely dependent on the whims of fashionable women.24 
Women’s extravagance could be blamed for the bankruptcy of 
France, their scheming for ruinous foreign policy, their patronage 
 20. Cf. LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC 200 (2000) (noting that in the 
early republic, “[m]otherhood was discussed almost as if it were a fourth branch of 
government”). 
 21. MARY BETH NORTON, SEPARATED BY THEIR SEX: WOMEN IN PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE IN THE COLONIAL ATLANTIC WORLD, at xiv (2011). 
 22. Id. at 101. 
 23. Id. at 102 (quoting JOHN DUNTON, PETTICOAT GOVERNMENT 97 (1702)). 
 24. See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, PERSIAN LETTERS 197 (C.J. Betts, ed. & trans., 
Penguin 1973) (1721) at 197 (Letter 107, Rica to Ibben) (“[F]or every man who has any 
post at court, in Paris, or in the country, there is a woman through whose hands pass all the 
favours and sometimes the injustices that he does. These women are all in touch with one 
another, and compose a sort of commonwealth whose members are always busy giving 
each other mutual help and support. It is like another state within the state, and a man who 
watches the actions of ministers, officials, or prelates at court, in Paris, or in the country, 
without knowing the women who rule them, is like a man who can see a machine in action 
but does not know what makes it work”).   
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for the appointment of the inept and corrupt, their control over 
cultural life for the effeminacy of the French nation.25 The 
embodiment of all these evils was Marie Antoinette. There was a 
widespread view that upper-class women, whose exercise of secret 
power was associated with some of the worst excesses of the Old 
Regime, had to be purged from the system if it was to have a hope 
of avoiding corruption. As for the mobs of lower class women, 
they could be excluded from political rights on much the same 
theory as were the “children, the insane, and the infamous” with 
whom they were so often lumped26—the theory that a rational 
political system demands rational, informed, responsible 
participants.27 As a result, French women, who had been voters 
from the time of Philip the Fair in the 14th century and who had 
participated in voting for the Estates General of 1789 on terms 
nearly equal to those of men,28 were denied all voting rights in the 
Revolution and did not regain them until 1946. 
While anti-feminist French legislators took from their history 
the desirability of women’s permanent exclusion from political 
life and power, French feminists like Marie Olympe de Gouges 
 25. Although he balances the catalogue with examples of males influenced by private 
passion quite apart from any female influence, Alexander Hamilton’s account of the 
baleful influence of women who “abused the confidence they possessed” is much like that 
of the French. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, Concerning Dangers from Dissensions 
Between the States, Independent Journal, Wednesday, Nov. 14, 1787 (“Pericles, in 
compliance with the resentment of a prostitute, at the expense of much of the . . . treasure 
of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the Samnians. . . . The 
influence which the bigotry of one female [Madame de Maintenon], the petulance of 
another [Duchess of Marlborough], and the cabals of a third [Madame de Pompadour], 
had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of 
Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known”). 
 26. Archives Parlementaires 29 April 1793, report of Languinas p. 562. 
 27. For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, “La Révolution n’a rien fait pour 
les pauvres femmes”: The Rhetoric and Reality of Political Rights for Women in the 
French Revolution (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). I was delighted to 
have the opportunity, in returning to the University of Virginia for the Beard Conference, 
to pursue themes I first voiced there in my 1990 job talk for the University of Virginia 
School of Law. 
 28. The regulations governing the convocation of the Estates General of 1789 
explicitly gave noble females with fiefs and communities of religious women the right to 
name proxies to represent them. For the Third Estate, the regulations called for 
participation by all inhabitants on the tax rolls of cities and other communities, assembled 
by corporation, with those not belonging to a corporation or similar body electing separate 
delegates. There was substantial regional variation in the interpretation of this 
requirement, including the extent to which women were meant to participate. In general 
practice, however, the unit of participation seems to have been, not the individual, but the 
hearth and almost all the numerous women recorded as participating in local assemblies 
are described as “widows” or unmarried “girls maintaining their own hearths.” 
Occasionally, however, married women with substantial property in their own name 
appear to have sent their husbands as their proxies. For further elaboration, see LÉON 
ABENSOUR, LA FEMME ET LE FÉMINISME AVANT LA REVOLUTION 325-52 (1923).  
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instead argued that women’s corrupt misrule would end only 
when they are better educated, are given job opportunities that 
do not involve the sale of their sexual favors, and have direct 
rather than devious access to power. De Gouges saw the best hope 
for improvement in the passage of laws providing for women to 
be educated and “to join in all the activities of men. If man insists 
on finding this means impracticable, let him share his fortune with 
woman, not according to his whim, but according to the wisdom 
of the law.”29 
Just as Olympe de Gouges’s demand for a legally mandated 
sharing of power and property between the sexes resonates with 
that of Abigail Adams, the French revolutionary notion that 
women already had so much power in the home and in society 
that they couldn’t be afforded any power in the state, that it would 
upset the balance of power to give them political rights, is 
consistent with John Adams’s expressed view that men were 
already their wives’ subjects and would be victims of petticoat 
despotism if they yielded further. 
THE LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE OF 
UNENFRANCHISED WOMEN 
A much more benign view of women’s behind-the-scenes 
influence on politics comes through in Mary Ritter Beard’s essay 
The Legislative Influence of Unenfranchised Women,30 published 
a year after her husband’s Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution and six years before the ratification of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, in the midst of a campaign for woman 
suffrage in which she was an active participant.31 She contrasts two 
 29. MARIE OLYMPE DE GOUGES, DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN AND 
THE FEMALE CITIZEN (1791). Among the laws for improving the financial aspects of 
relations between the sexes De Gouges proposed were ones mandating equal inheritance, 
indemnities for seduced and abandoned women, rights for the illegitimate to “the name 
and property of the father,” community of property in marriage, and equal division in case 
of divorce. She further favored laws providing for termination of marriages at will, clerical 
marriage, and the restriction of prostitutes to designated quarters. None of these proposals 
was outrageous for its time. Indeed, many were enacted by the Revolutionary legislature. 
But Olympe de Gouges herself was guillotined, a fact which may cast in a darker light John 
Adams’s apparently flip insistence that male prerogatives should be defended by force if 
necessary. For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, Olympe de Gouges: “Foremother” 
of Feminists? Or their Heir? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).  
 30. MARY RITTER BEARD, The Legislative Influence of Unenfranchised Women, 56 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 54 (1914), reprinted in MARY RITTER BEARD, A 
SOURCEBOOK 89-94 (Ann J. Lane ed., 1977). 
 31. Mary Ritter Beard worked both ends of the suffrage campaign, giving a 
Statement to the House Committee on Woman Suffrage and campaigning to win over  
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forces behind “invisible government”: the malign force of 
“powerful economic interests, organized and always alert” and 
the “beneficent influences . . . of voteless women.”32 
With respect to those women powerful enough to engage in 
“statesmanlike wire-pulling, . . . organized efforts of women for 
the accomplishment of definite programs; lobbies in legislative 
chambers . . . and cooperation with men in organized legislative 
effort,”33 Mary Ritter Beard seems to imagine them nearly exempt 
from the pursuit of self-interest her husband looked for in the 
Framers. All the issues with respect to which she lists these 
women as exerting influence, with the exception of “legislation 
dealing with their own enfranchisement,”34 involve “local 
improvements of one kind or another” or “the progress of modern 
social legislation of all kinds.”35 Yet, in urging “Votes for 
Workingwomen,” Mary Ritter Beard stressed “they need the vote 
for what it can do for them” on issues including “[t]he white slave 
traffic, mothers’ pensions, unemployment, education, child labor” 
and a host of others she enumerated “which vitally affect 
workingwomen and will never be dealt with to their advantage 
until they make themselves felt as human beings with minds and 
hearts.”36 And she found it “interesting to note that those women 
most actively using indirect influence are coming to prefer direct 
action on their own account.”37 
FREEING THE SLAVES, BUT NOT A MAN’S WIFE AND 
DAUGHTERS 
Just as Charles Beard mentions, but does not analyze in 
detail, the financial incentives the Framers might have had for 
opposing either political power for their wives and mothers or a 
reform of the laws of coverture as proposed by Abigail Adams, he 
also mentions, but does not analyze, their possible financial stake 
in denying political power and legal rights to their unmarried 
daughters. Beard notes that 
working class men. See MARY RITTER BEARD, Statement to the House Committee on 
Woman Suffrage, in MARY RITTER BEARD, A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 100. 
 32. RITTER BEARD, The Legislative Influence, supra note 30, at 89-90. 
 33. Id. at 90. 
 34. Id. at 91. 
 35. Id. at 93. 
 36. MARY RITTER BEARD, Votes for Workingwomen, 3 WOMAN VOTER 3 (1912), 
reprinted in MARY RITTER BEARD, A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 80, 84. 
 37. RITTER BEARD, The Legislative Influence, supra note 30, at 94.  
 
8 - THE LADIES, FORGET ABOUT THEM (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2014 9:45 AM 
440 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:431 
Hamilton in his report on manufactures . . . observes that one 
of the advantages of the extensive introduction of machinery 
will be “the employment of persons who would otherwise be 
idle, and in many cases, a burthen on the community, either 
from bias of temper, habit, infirmity of body, or some other 
cause, indisposing or disqualifying them for the toils of the 
country. It is worthy of remark, that, in general, women and 
children are rendered more useful, and the latter more early 
useful, by manufacturing establishments, than they would 
otherwise be. Of the number of persons employed in the cotton 
manufactories of Great Britain, it is computed that four-
sevenths, nearly, are women and children; of whom the greatest 
proportion are children, many of them of a tender age.” 
Apparently this advantage was, in Hamilton’s view, to accrue 
principally to the fathers of families, for he remarks: “The 
husbandman himself experiences a new source of profit and 
support, from the increased industry of his wife and daughters, 
invited and stimulated by the demands of the neighboring 
manufactories.”38 
Although Beard ends his economic history with the framing 
of the original Constitution, it is worthy of note that, in the 
debates around the framing of the post-Civil War Amendments, 
the continued economic interests of the fathers of families in the 
labor of their wives and daughters was front and center in debates 
about the expected meaning of these Amendments. Thus, as Jill 
Hasday observed, “congressmen on all sides of the debates over 
the Fourteenth Amendment hoped that the amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause would not be read to disrupt common law 
coverture or prohibit sex discrimination, even as their discussion 
of the amendment made clear that such an interpretation of equal 
protection was possible.”39 And, as Lea VanderVelde, among 
others, has documented, whatever their inclinations with respect 
to the abolition of Negro chattel slavery, congressmen were at 
pains to insist “that the term ‘involuntary servitude’ not apply to 
family relationships where the head of the household legally held 
a property right in the services of other household members.”40 
Thus, for example, Chilton White of Ohio argued against 
abolition and in favor of due process and compensation for slave 
owners as follows: 
 38. BEARD, supra note 1, at 24-26. 
 39. Jill Elaine Hasday, Women’s Exclusion from the Constitutional Canon, 2013 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1715, 1719 (2013). 
 40. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. 
L. REV. 437, 454 (1989).  
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The parent has the right to the service of his child; he has a 
property in the service of that child. A husband has a right of 
property in the service of his wife; he has the right to the 
management of his household affairs . . . . All these rights rest 
upon the same basis as a man’s right of property in the service 
of slaves. The relation is clearly and distinctly defined by the 
law, and as clearly and distinctly recognized by the Constitution 
of the United States.41 
And, after ratification, Senator Edgar Cowan, “the primary 
voice for a limited thirteenth amendment,”42 insisted: 
Now . . . in all good faith, what was the meaning of that [phrase, 
“involuntary servitude”]? What was its intent? Can there be 
any doubt of it? . . . That amendment, everybody knows and 
nobody dare deny, was simply made to liberate the negro slave 
from his master. That is all there is of it. Will . . . anybody . . . 
undertake to say that that was to prevent the involuntary 
servitude of my child to me, of my apprentice to me, or the 
quasi servitude which the wife to some extent owes to her 
husband? Certainly not.43 
A POSSIBLE RESPONSE: SLAVERY IN THE OTHER 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS44 
If one wanted to work within an originalist framework to 
vindicate some of the rights of women as wives and daughters and 
 41. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 215 (1865) (remarks of Rep. White), 
quoted in VanderVelde, supra note 40, at 454-55. 
 42. VanderVelde, supra note 40, at 456. 
 43. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 499 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan), 
quoted in VanderVelde, supra note 40, at 457. Cowan later observed, “Nobody can pretend 
that those things were within the purview of that amendment; nobody believes it. It was 
mentioned as a matter of ridicule, in some places, that it did actually liberate the minor 
from the control of his parent or guardian; that it did actually entitle the wife to be paid 
for her own services, that they should not go to the husband; but that was false.” See CONG. 
GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1784 (1866) (Civil Rights Bill) (remarks of Sen. Cowan), 
quoted in VanderVelde, supra note 40, at n.93. According to VanderVelde “No 
congressmen claimed the term should apply to wives or children.” VanderVelde, supra 
note 40, at 457.  
 44. This section is an extremely abbreviated form of the argument in Mary Anne 
Case, Slavery in the Other Domestic Relations, Panel Address during the University of 
Chicago-Loyola University Law School Symposium: Slavery, Abolition, and Human 
Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Thirteenth Amendment (Apr. 18, 2009) 
(transcript on file with author). In prior work, I have argued that the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee of sex equality, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is a 
fundamental commitment of the United States which it was “incumbent on government to 
follow-through on . . . in its necessary interventions into the family and the private sphere, 
such as its custody and adoption decisions.” Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism 
as an Individual and Constitutional Commitment, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 
549, 561 (2011). I distinguished in that work between fundamentalism (defined as an  
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workers, one might nevertheless begin with the Thirteenth 
Amendment. As the Supreme Court recognized in Frontiero, 
“throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in 
our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks 
under the pre-Civil War slave codes.” 45 In addition to the legal 
restrictions enumerated in Frontiero, 46 laws, ratified by the 
Supreme Court in cases from Bradwell v. Illinois47 through 
Goesaert v. Cleary,48 had also disabled women from pursuing 
many forms of paid employment. Of course, many legal 
disabilities were those of married women, but just as a case like 
Dred Scott extended the disabilities of slaves to blacks in general,49 
so a case like Bradwell, with the concurrence of Justice Bradley, 
extended the disabilities of married women to women in general.50 
inability to compromise) and perfectionism (defined as a willingness to impose). Id. at 551. 
My analysis here shows that one way of interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment is as a 
perfectionist requirement of government intervention to prevent extreme forms of 
submission by wives and daughters to husbands and fathers. This more perfectionist 
approach would likely involve more active government intrusions into intact families (i.e. 
those not already before the courts because of disputes over, for example, custody) to 
combat unequal treatment on the basis of sex, even if stops short of what is now treated as 
abuse. 
 45. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). 
 46. See id. (“Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit 
in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to 
hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children”). 
 47. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (holding that Illinois could exclude women 
categorically from the practice of law). 
 48. 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding a law precluding all women other than the 
wife and daughter of a bar’s owner from tending bar notwithstanding the possibility that 
“the real impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to 
try to monopolize the calling”). 
 49. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405, 407 (1856) (holding that “neither the 
class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had 
become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people”: they were, instead, 
an “inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether 
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges 
but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them”). 
 50. Bradwell 83 U.S. at 141-2 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) ( “It is true that many 
women are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties, complications, and 
incapacities arising out of the married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. . 
. . And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and 
cannot be based upon exceptional cases.”). Cf. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan 
(May 26. 1776), available at http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ADMS-06-04-02-
0091 (“Government cannot accommodate itself to every particular Case, as it happens, nor 
to the Circumstances of particular Persons. It must establish general, comprehensive 
Regulations for Cases and Persons. The only Question is, which general Rule, will 
accommodate most Cases and most Persons.”) As I have previously argued, the core of 
our current constitutional law of sex discrimination, for which Bradley’s opinion in 
Bradwell serves as a negative precedent, is precisely that when it comes to sex “‘the rules 
of civil society’ not only can but ‘must be adapted to . . . exceptional cases.’” See Mary 
Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination 
Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1471 (2000).  
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Focusing on the “especially harsh forms of labor control”51 
women are subjected to, not only in the labor market, but also in 
the household, reinforces the notion that slavery is one of the 
domestic relations and invites a focus on two of the others—
husband and wife and father and daughter. Feminists such as 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton argued that “[a]ccording to man’s idea, 
as set forth in his creed and codes, marriage is a condition of 
slavery.”52 One need not accept this argument categorically and 
argue, contrary to the views of its framers, that all marital and 
filial relations are called into question by the Thirteenth 
Amendment to make the case that some are. Thus, in the same 
way as the parent-child relationship is not enough to save the 
master-slave relationship between a white man and his child by a 
black slave, so neither a wife’s slave-like submission to her 
husband 53 nor a daughter’s to her father should be free from legal 
scrutiny. 
Unique textual features of the Thirteenth Amendment come 
into play here: The Amendment bans slavery categorically, 
whether voluntary on the part of the slave or not. 
And, in declaring that “neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude . . . shall exist within the United States,” the 
Amendment’s relationship to state action has two distinctive 
features—not only does the Amendment reach beyond 
governmental action to private action, it also requires the state to 
act. The Amendment puts the state under an obligation to 
eradicate slavery, creating, extraordinarily under U.S. law, a 
positive constitutional right. As scholars have suggested, the 
Thirteenth Amendment therefore can be seen to have 
implications for the government’s obligations toward children 
 51. James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional 
Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1500-01 (2010) (“ In addition to race, 
sex might play an important role in Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. . . . The relation 
of sex to labor rights is complicated by the ideology of separate spheres, the unpaid 
character of women’s work in the home, and the problem of uncompensated reproductive 
labor . . . Women, like members of subordinate racially defined groups, often tend to be 
targeted for especially harsh forms of labor control”). 
 52. Quoted in AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, 
MARRIAGE AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 176 (1998). 
 53. See, e.g., Spires v. Spires, 743 A.2d 186, 192 (D.C. 1999) (Schweib, J. concurring) 
(“[A] ‘contract’ such as the one between these parties, which formalizes and seeks to 
legitimize absolute male domination and female subordination within the marital 
relationship, is against the public policy of this jurisdiction. It may not be enforced in our 
courts, nor can it be permitted to affect adversely the rights of the oppressed wife or her 
children. . . . [T]he parties’ now-defunct marriage made Mrs. Spires her former husband’s 
partner, not his slave.”).  
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abused by their parents54 and wives abused by their husbands55 as 
well as for the authorized scope of government action with respect 
to women and girls.56 
Given that the Thirteenth Amendment’s framers viewed 
slavery and polygamy as “twin relics of barbarism,”57 a 
particularly apt situation in which to invoke the Amendment 
might be in quest of a remedy more effective than hitherto offered 
under state law to the underage plural wives and other children of 
the Fundamentalist Church of the Latter Day Saints (FLDS), 
whom the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services 
tried unsuccessfully in 2008 to remove from their families on the 
Yearning for Zion ranch.58 Accounts by those who have escaped 
the FLDS tell of girls “treated like an indentured servant, forc[ed] 
to do all the cooking, cleaning and babysitting,” being denied 
education, put at risk of physical violence and sexual assault, 
“condemned to a life of virtual slavery,” and taught that “[a] 
woman’s role is to be obedient without question to her 
husband.”59 
 54. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A 
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377 (1992) 
(arguing that “[w]hen the child’s interests are utterly disregarded” as Joshua DeShaney’s 
were by his father “the child is in effect being treated as a possession, as a chattel—as a 
slave” and the state is under a Thirteenth Amendment duty to act). 
 55. See, e.g., Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary 
Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992) (arguing 
that both civil and criminal constitutional claims could be brought against some batterers 
who hold their victims in what amounts to involuntary servitude). 
 56. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1942 (2012) (“When abortion is prohibited, the 
state is doing what it was doing when it enslaved women before the Civil War”); 
Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, Comment, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence 
Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (1988) (arguing that the Thirteenth 
Amendment could provide the constitutional support the Supreme Court held that the 
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide for a 
federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence). 
 57. See Republican Platform of 1856, available at http://www.ushistory.org
/gop/convention_1856republicanplatform.htm (“[I]t is both the right and the imperative 
duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism—Polygamy, 
and Slavery.”) 
 58. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. May 22, 
2008) (finding that there had been no proof of risk of imminent physical harm to the 
children, despite the concern of the Department that “due to the ‘pervasive belief system’ 
of the FLDS, the male children are groomed to be perpetrators of sexual abuse and the 
girls are raised to be victims of sexual abuse”). 
 59. See Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between 
Government and Family Responsibility for Children, 2009 UTAH L.REV. 381, 404-05 
(quoting accounts of former members of the FLDS). As I have previously argued, 
convicting some of the patriarchs of the FLDS of rape after the fact does little to protect 
the girls who are their victims and a failure to protect these girls is a failure to offer equal 
protection on grounds of sex. Id. at 401-06.  
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THE LESSONS OF ORIGINALISM FOR FEMINISM AND 
OF FEMINISM FOR ORIGINALISM 
I have used the specific possibility of making legal arguments 
against the slavelike submission of wives and daughters 
notwithstanding the claims of the framers of the Thirteenth 
Amendment that their intent was to leave in place the law of 
domestic relations other than master and slave to show what 
creative opportunities not inconsistent with originalism there 
might be for feminist legal arguments. But unquestionably the 
broader conclusion one must reach after examining the history of 
the framing of both the original constitution and the post-Civil 
War Amendments is that no version of original meaning—not the 
specific intent of the Framers, not the general understanding of 
the ratifiers, not the original public meaning, not the original 
expected application, nor any other version of what originalists 
may say they look to in order to determine the scope of 
constitutional provisions holds much promise for yielding what 
Abigail Adams demanded of John—a constitutionally mandated 
code of laws more “generous and favorable” to women than the 
one the Framers inherited. As Ward Farnsworth carefully 
demonstrated, even the heroic efforts scholars have devoted to an 
originalist defense of racial desegregation60 would, if turned to 
questions of originalism and women’s rights, lead “to the 
conclusion that nineteenth-century laws imposing serious legal 
disabilities on women were constitutional.”61 
Scholars, lawyers, and activists have had a variety of 
responses to this well-nigh inescapable conclusion. Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, whose litigation on behalf of the ACLU Women’s 
Right’s Project made the constitutional law of sex discrimination 
what it is today, frankly acknowledged early on: 
Boldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically from the 
original understanding, is required to tie to the fourteenth 
amendment’s equal protection clause a command that 
government treat men and women as individuals equal in 
rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.62 
 60. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 
81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995).  
 61. Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional 
Understanding, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2000). 
 62. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights 
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 161.  
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Despite Ginsburg’s success in entrenching a constitutional 
case law of sex equality,63 some have concluded it continues to be 
crucial to ratify an Equal Rights Amendment so as to lay a 
groundwork for constitutional sex equality even originalists 
would have to acknowledge.64 Many supportive of claims for 
women’s rights and sex equality have argued in various ways that 
the Nineteenth Amendment, read correctly and broadly, can be 
used to ground claims for sex equality under the Constitution, 
including but not limited to those already accepted by the 
Supreme Court.65 
Giving feminists cause for worry, however, some of the most 
prominent self-proclaimed originalists have announced 
themselves perfectly comfortable with the conclusion that the 
Constitution does not prohibit sex discrimination. Most notorious 
 63. She was later able to ratify this constitutional case law as a Justice in United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and see it endorsed by Chief Justice Rehnquist as 
sufficient to ground Section 5 power in Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 
(2003). 
 64. Cf. Mike Rappaport, Originalism and Sex Discrimination VI: Originalism, 
Nonoriginalism, and the (Possible) Failure of the Constitution to Protect Against Sex Based 
Distinctions, The Originalism Blog (Dec. 23, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://originalismblog.
typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2011/12/originalism-and-sex-discrimination-vi-
originalism-nonoriginalism-and-the-possible-failure-of-the-con.html. (“If the original 
meaning of the Constitution does not protect against sex discrimination, it is not the fault 
of originalism. Instead, it is the fault of nonoriginalism. The reason is that there seems little 
doubt that an equal rights amendment would have passed in the 1970s if not for 
nonoriginalism”). 
 65. See, e.g., W. William Hodes, Women and the Constitution: Some Legal History 
and a New Approach to the Nineteenth Amendment, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 26 (1970); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465 (1995); Reva 
B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the 
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism 
and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-15 (2011). Calbresi and Rickert also make a 
Fourteenth Amendment argument on behalf of women’s equality, but it appears to be a 
textualist, rather than an originalist argument: They acknowledge that the Amendment’s 
Framers and their contemporaries clearly did not see the Amendment as calling laws 
restrictive of women into question, but, they assert this was because of “unenacted factual 
beliefs about the capabilities of women” and “[w]e now know more about women’s 
capabilities than the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers knew.” Id. at 9. To the extent this 
really is a claim about the evolution of knowledge of ordinary facts, not the evolution of 
political judgements, I see no evidence to support it. The Framers did not doubt their wives 
and daughters abilities as a matter of fact—they were in far greater doubt of the abilities 
of the blacks they did enfranchise, which is what allowed Elizabeth Cady Stanton to make, 
as early as 1848, the unsuccessful arguments for which she is castigated today about the 
mistake of enfranchising uneducated immigrant men before educated WASP women. See 
e.g., Address by Elizabeth Cady Stanton on Woman’s Rights, September 1848, available at 
http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/docs/ecswoman1.html (“[T]o have the rights of drunkards, idiots, 
horse-racing, rum selling rowdies, ignorant foreigners, and silly boys fully recognised, 
whilst we ourselves are thrust out from all the rights that belong to citizens—it is too grossly 
insulting to the dignity of woman to be longer quietly submitted to”).  
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among them is Justice Scalia. When interviewer Calvin Massey 
put it to him that: 
In 1868, when the 39th Congress was debating and ultimately 
proposing the 14th Amendment, I don’t think anybody would 
have thought that equal protection applied to sex 
discrimination, or certainly not to sexual orientation. So does 
that mean that we’ve gone off in error by applying the 14th 
Amendment to both? 66 
Scalia responded: 
Yes, yes. Sorry, to tell you that. . . . But, you know, if indeed 
the current society has come to different views, that’s fine. You 
do not need the Constitution to reflect the wishes of the current 
society. Certainly the Constitution does not require 
discrimination on the basis of sex. The only issue is whether it 
prohibits it. It doesn’t. Nobody ever thought that that’s what it 
meant. Nobody ever voted for that. If the current society wants 
to outlaw discrimination by sex, hey we have things called 
legislatures, and they enact things called laws. You don’t need 
a constitution to keep things up-to-date. All you need is a 
legislature and a ballot box.67 
 66. The Originalist: Justice Antonin Scalia, CALIFORNIA LAWYER (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=913358 (interview with Calvin Massey). 
 67. Id. Even Scalia appears to lack the courage of his convictions, because, when 
questioned about precisely these statements by Senator Dianne Feinstein, who read them 
back to him verbatim, he insisted that he “was speaking of Title VII and laws that prohibit 
private discrimination. The 14th Amendment says nothing about private discrimination, 
only discrimination by Government.” Considering the Role of Judges Under the 
Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before the Committee on Judiciary of the Senate 
of the United States, 112th Cong. 37 (Oct. 5, 2011), at 20. Whatever else may be unclear 
about Scalia’s views, he was clearly speaking of the Constitution, not Title VII, in his 
California Lawyer interview. More recently, when questioned by Jennifer Senior, he again 
abjured: 
 
What about sex discrimination? Do you think the Fourteenth Amendment covers 
it?  
Of course it covers it! No, you can’t treat women differently, give them higher 
criminal sentences. Of course not. 
A couple of years ago, I think you told California Lawyer something different. 
What I was referring to is: The issue is not whether it prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of sex. Of course it does. The issue is, What is discrimination? If there’s 
a reasonable basis for not letting women do something like going into combat or 
whatnot . . . 
 
Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 7, 2013. Of course, in 
many states for much of U.S. history, women were indeed treated differently in criminal 
sentencing and given higher sentences, for example under statutes that provided 
indeterminate sentences for them, and shorter fixed sentences for men. See e.g., Paula C. 
Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American Women in Crime 
and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 26-29 (1995) (citing examples of unequal 
sentencing laws and noting that “[c]ourts justified legislative distinctions which imposed  
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I must confess that I approach the question of the effect of an 
originalist approach like Scalia’s on constitutional interpretation 
of protections against laws that discriminate on the basis of sex in 
Beardian terms, motivated by a combination of “interests [I] 
underst[and] and fe[el] in concrete, definite form through [my] 
own personal experience” and “the guidance of abstract 
principles of political science.”68 Richard Fallon has expressed 
concern that 
an originalist theory that . . . left the contemporary 
constitutionality of paper money and Social Security hostage to 
the outcome of historical tests that they might not pass—
despite the devastating consequences that their invalidation 
would entail—might rate high on the scale of being principled, 
but it also would be morally, politically, and legally 
irresponsible.69 
I am much more worried about an originalist theory that will 
find coverture and the elimination of women from public life 
constitutional. After all, I am a single woman, licensed to practice 
law, gainfully employed, with liberty and equality that non-
originalist constitutional case law, (and not any version of 
originalism) has guaranteed me, and a concern that the 
overturning of precedent by a principled originalist might have 
“devastating consequences” for me personally and the “abstract 
principles” I am guided by and committed to. In past work, I have 
called these abstract principles “feminist fundamentalism,”70 
which I have defined as an uncompromising commitment to the 
equality of the sexes, further specified in my own particular case 
(in terms taken, as it happens, from the current U.S. constitutional 
case law) as an uncompromising opposition to “fixed notions 
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.”71 The 
substantive rules that were in place and reaffirmed by the Framers 
of both the original Constitution and the post-Civil War 
Amendments with respect to women are, for both personal and 
ideological reasons, rules I don’t want to live with. 
longer sentences on women than men as reasonable in view of the state’s purpose of 
providing more effective rehabilitation for women”). 
 68. See supra note 1. 
 69. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are 
They Rationalizations for Conservatism? 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 20 (2011). 
 70. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism as an Individual and 
Constitutional Commitment, supra note 43. 
 71. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).  
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It was because of these commitments and concerns that, in 
2010, I accepted the invitation of the Federalist Society to appear 
as the only woman with a speaking part in their national 
symposium, Originalism 2.0. As I explained to the Federalists, I 
understood quite well why, if the topic was originalism, they really 
needed a woman to speak, even if to find one they had to reach 
out to someone like me who was neither a Federalist nor a fellow 
traveler of Federalists, who had not in the past either written, 
spoken, or even thought very hard about originalism, and who had 
been spending almost as much time with the canon law as with the 
U.S. Constitution in the preceding year. The question I had for 
the Federalists was, having defended Brown on originalist 
grounds, do you also defend Frontiero and its progeny, and, if you 
cannot, what constitutional brake is there to a return to coverture 
and the rest of the “masculine systems” John Adams and his 
fellow Framers refused to repeal? The question the Federalist 
Society asked me to address was, “Is originalism a rationalization 
for conservatism or a principled theory of interpretation?” 
I began my remarks by agreeing with Richard Fallon that 
even if originalism can be a principled theory of interpretation this 
does not mean it is indeed employed as such or that it should be. 
I illustrated this point with an analogy to astrology, noting that, 
several decades ago, when I was a practicing lawyer in New York, 
I was in a reading group with, among others, a professional 
astrologist, who would try her best, whatever book we were 
reading, to chart the horoscopes of the characters. She was a very 
serious and principled astrologist, but frustrated in her efforts 
because there was not usually enough relevant information in the 
books to chart the characters in a way to get a determinate 
principled result. That, mutatis mutandis, is also a problem with 
originalism. Additionally, however, it does not seem we are 
engaged in principled originalism any more than people are 
engaging in principled astrology when they do not look to a 
careful and specified charting of their own signs and the signs of 
the people around them, but turn to the Daily News or the New 
York Post, look for their sun sign, read a simple, single little 
phrase that’s billed as their fortune for the day, and take it 
seriously.72 
 72. Cf. Mary Anne Case, Are Plain Hamburgers Now Unconstitutional? The Equal 
Protection Component of Bush v. Gore as a Chapter in the History of Ideas About Law, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 55, n.3 (2003) (observing that if the “Supreme Court had determined a 
winner in Bush v Gore, not by constitutional adjudication, but by divination, as the ancients 
often claimed to select leaders. . . . it might be noteworthy whether the decision was framed  
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In the very limited time that I had to prepare to address the 
Federalist Society, I tried to educate myself as to what role 
originalism had actually played in Supreme Court cases. I was 
surprised to learn, when I looked for basic descriptive empirical 
work that systematically examined U.S. Supreme Court cases in 
which originalist arguments could have been employed to see if 
they were employed, and if so, by whom, and how often these 
arguments were outcome-determinative, that such work did not 
appear to have been done.73 There is a great deal of published 
work available on the theory of originalism, but apparently very 
little on the practice. I think this undercuts the notion that 
originalism is being applied in any kind of principled fashion, and 
it is not clear to me that to attempt to apply it in a principled 
fashion would make any more sense than to apply astrology in a 
principled fashion. Perhaps it can be done, but we do not do it, 
and, as Fallon cogently argues, we may be right not to. Among the 
many reasons not to is that delving into eighteenth-century 
archives, like delving into the motions of the planets, seems an 
enterprise too far removed from the subjects directly at issue in 
constitutional cases to be geared toward generating either 
productive conversation or helpful insights.74 
Even more instructive than an analogy to astrology, and less 
susceptible of being dismissed as flip, is the analogy of originalism 
to biblical literalism. It does seem to make much more sense to 
want to interpret a text according to its original intent if you think 
that the original intent is the intent of God.75 And it is certainly 
by reference to astrology rather than palmistry or the reading of entrails, although it is 
possible to choose any of these techniques in good or bad faith, to apply any one well or 
badly by its own terms, and to make a choice of technique consistent with or divergent 
from one’s usual choices”). 
 73. It is my understanding that my colleague Eric Posner, together with Lee Epstein, 
has recently embarked on such empirical work and I look forward to reading it when it is 
complete. See generally FRANK CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013) 
(evaluating the use and absence of originalist arguments in Supreme Court opinions).  
 74. The same cannot, by contrast, be as readily said of, for example, either a Ronald 
Dworkin-style moral reading of the Constitution or a Richard Posner-style economic 
analysis of law, whatever other limitations these approaches may have. Cf. Justice Alito in 
the oral argument of Brown v. EMA, 2010 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 57, at *14 (“I think what 
Justice Scalia wants to know is what James Madison thought about video games. . . . Did 
he enjoy them?”) Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 
S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No. 08-1448), 2010 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 57. Even asking, as Scalia insisted 
he was, “what James Madison thought about violence,” id., risks turning the discussion 
away from legal reasoning toward antiquarianism the more seriously it is taken not merely 
as a relevant but as the outcome determinative question. 
 75. Cf. BEARD, WOMEN AS FORCE IN HISTORY, supra note 14, at 90 (“Jefferson was 
scarcely exaggerating when he wrote long after the Commentaries appeared: ‘The opinion  
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the case that people take biblical literalism much more seriously; 
they are much more interested in getting it right and doing the 
necessary work, whatever in their faith tradition that work is seen 
to be, to see what original intent might be. 
Much has already been said and much still remains to be said 
about the connections between methods for the interpretation of 
constitutional and biblical texts. Both constitutional and biblical 
texts are susceptible to tensions between clause bound and 
holistic interpretations. Both present the challenge of interpreting 
as a coherent whole a document theoretically propounded by a 
single authoritative voice—whether that of God or We The 
People—but actually written by multiple authors over a period of 
centuries. Reading together the first and the second creation story 
in Genesis or the Old and the New Testaments presents 
challenges akin to reading together the original constitution, the 
Bill of Rights and the post-Civil War Amendments.76 It is 
noteworthy to me as a comparativist that the United States, with 
a dominant Protestant tradition of biblical exegesis overshadowed 
by claims of biblical inerrancy, is virtually the only country to take 
originalism seriously as a method of constitutional 
interpretation.77 Strict textualism is akin to sola scriptura. And in 
France, with its Catholic heritage, Portalis, one of the principal 
authors of the Napoleonic Civil Code, endorsed an interpretive 
method far closer to living constitutionalism than originalism.78 
According to David Strauss, pursuing the analogy between 
originalism and Protestantism cuts against the position that 
originalism is conservative: 
seems to be that Blackstone is to us what the Alcoran is to the Mahometans, that 
everything which is necessary is in him, and what is not in him is not necessary’”). 
 76. For an example of interpretive problems posed for originalists in the writing of 
the present day Constitution by multiple authors in multiple centuries, see Jamal Greene, 
Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 979 (2012) (arguing that, 
contrary to common practice, “[a]n originalist who believes that the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated against state governments some or all of the rights protected by 
the Bill of Rights should, in adjudicating cases under incorporated provisions, be 
concerned primarily (if not exclusively) with determining how the generation that ratified 
that amendment,” rather than the eighteenth-century Framers of the Bill of Rights, 
“understood the scope and substance of the rights at issue”). 
 77. See, e.g., Jill Lepore, The Commandments: The Constitution and Its Worshippers, 
NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011, at 70, 76 (“Originalism, which has no purchase anywhere but 
here, has a natural affinity with some varieties of Protestantism, and the United States 
differs from all other Western democracies in the far greater proportion of its citizens who 
believe in the literal truth of the Bible”). 
 78. See Preliminary Address on the First Draft of the Civil Code Presented in the 
Year IX by Messrs. Portalis, Tronchet, Bigotpréameneu and Maleville, Member of the 
Government-Appointed Commission, (1801), translated and available at http://www.just
ice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/ilp-pji/code/index.html.  
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Perhaps the greatest of all originalist movements—the 
Protestant Reformation . . . attacked the existing order, the 
existing tradition, as corrupt and wrongheaded and called for a 
return to the text and the original understandings. Originalism 
is, therefore, in its essence, a destructive creed. It does not 
provide answers. It gives you a way of challenging the received 
wisdom. It is a way of getting rid of things. When you want to 
rebuild, when you want to start building up a doctrine, 
originalism does not really help you; it is too indeterminate.79 
Focusing on their approaches to women, let me pursue 
instead an analogy between American originalism and 
Anglicanism that points up originalism’s methodological as well 
as substantive conservative tendencies.80 
Keith Whittington has argued that the most prominent 
normative justification for originalism grounds it “in a theory of 
popular sovereignty and democratic lawmaking. . . . One should 
be an originalist because the Constitution was authorized by 
democratically elected delegates who had legitimate authority to 
ratify the constitutional text.”81 
Among the earliest prescriptions for democratic lawmaking 
is a Latin maxim that had its origins in the Roman law of 
guardianship, migrated into the canon law, and expanded into 
political theory as early as the Middle Ages. It goes by the Latin 
tag quod omnes tangit, short for either Quod omnes tangit, ab 
omnibus approbetur or alternatively Quod omnes tangit omnibus 
tractari et approbari debet, meaning, “What touches all must be 
[debated and] approved by all.”82 Some see this maxim behind the 
French king’s invocation of the Estates General, which, as noted 
above, did include women in each of the three estates from the 
14th century on. 
 79. David Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. L. & 
PUB. POLICY 137, 144 (2011). It should go without saying that if Strauss is right I have 
much to fear from an application of originalism to the sex equality precedents I hold dear. 
 80. The analogy I am pursuing here applies to originalism in the American context, 
but would not extend to a constitution in whose framing and ratification women were fully 
included. Cf. Kerri A. Froc, Is Originalism Bad for Women? The Curious Case of Canada’s 
“Equal Rights Amendment” (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (considering an 
originalist approach to Sec. 28 of the Canadian Constitution that takes full account of the 
views of its “feminist framers”). 
 81. Keith E. Whittingon, Is Originalism Too Conservative? 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 29, 39 (2011). Fallon, Whittington, and I were asked to address the same topic by 
the Federalist Society. 
 82. See, e.g., GAINES POST, A Romano-Canonical Maxim, Quod omnes tangit, in 
Bracton and in Early Parliaments, in STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT: PUBLIC 
LAW AND THE STATE, 1100-1322 163 (1964).   
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Shortly before I spoke to the Federalist Society, I had the 
occasion to examine this maxim in the context of sex and gender 
in comments I was asked to write83 on Archbishop of Canterbury 
Rowan Williams’s discussion of the potential schism in the 
Anglican Church concerning issues, not only of homosexuality, 
but also the ordination of women as bishops. The Archbishop 
invoked this maxim of canon law, saying that, because “what 
affects the communion of all should be decided by all,” therefore 
the Anglican Communion has to move slowly with respect to 
change; it has to discuss and debate it.84 
Given the historical exclusion of women from 
decisionmaking in the Church and the historical exclusion of 
women from decisionmaking in the Republic, to require them, at 
the moment of their inclusion, to expend energy and political 
capital on effecting legislative repeal or constitutional 
amendment of every aspect of the legal system that is already 
stacked against them is to perpetuate their disadvantage when 
compared to those whose interests have already been taken into 
account because they could and did participate in the framing of 
the system. To use a maxim like quod omnes tangit or an 
interpretive methodology like originalism as a brake on change—
as a rationale for conservatism—leaves out those people who 
were not able to be part of the original process of popular 
sovereignty and democratic decisionmaking.85  
Were women a part of omnes in the framing of canon law? 
Were they a part of We the People in any meaningful sense in the 
framing of the original Constitution and post-Civil War 
Amendments?86 If Abigail Adams’s insistence that the Framers 
“remember the ladies” had no other effect on John, it may at least 
 83. Mary Anne Case, Homosexuality and the Anglican Debate, THE IMMANENT 
FRAME, blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2009/08/04/homosexuality-and-the-anglican-debate/. 
 84. Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Communion, Covenant and Our 
Anglican Future, THE GUARDIAN, Monday, 27 July 2009, http://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/27/rowan-williams-anglican-communion. 
 85. Thus, that women are currently included in democratic deliberation does not by 
itself remedy their prior exclusion. Nor is it determinative that, for example, the laws of 
coverture in the United States were never constitutionally mandated but were subjects of 
ordinary legislation. At the time women received the vote, they inherited a system of laws 
unfavorable to them, which served as a built-in headwind. To effect the repeal of such laws 
through the ordinary legislative processes would require an expenditure of effort and 
political capital not required of those groups whose interests were fully represented in the 
Constitution’s framing. 
 86. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In Order To Get Beyond Racism, We 
Must First Take Account of Race,” 1979 WASH. U .L.Q. 147, 152 (“My father came to this 
country when he was a teenager. Not only had he never profited from the sweat of any 
black man’s brow, I don’t think he had ever seen a black man.”).  
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have made him consider this question. When, in the spring of 
1776, James Sullivan, invoking quod omnes tangit, urged the 
elimination of property qualifications for voting, John Adams 
responded, with Abigail’s urging fresh in his mind: 
It is certain in Theory, that the only moral Foundation of 
Government is the Consent of the People. But to what an 
Extent Shall We carry this Principle? Shall We Say, that every 
Individual of the Community, old and young, male and female, 
as well as rich and poor, must consent, expressly to every Act 
of Legislation? No, you will Say. This is impossible. . . .Whence 
arises the Right of the Men to govern Women, without their 
Consent? 87 
Unfortunately, the conclusion John Adams draws from this 
is that it would be “dangerous to attemp[t] to alter the 
Qualifications of Voters” in any way because “[t]here will be no 
End of it. New Claims will arise. Women will demand a Vote.”88 
Adams argued that 
The Same Reasoning, which will induce you to admit all Men, 
who have no Property, to vote, with those who have, for those 
Laws, which affect the Person will prove that you ought to 
admit Women . . . for generally Speaking, Women. . . have as 
good Judgment, and as independent Minds as those Men who 
are wholly destitute of Property: these last being to all Intents 
and Purposes as much dependent upon others, who will please 
to feed, cloath, and employ them, as Women are upon their 
Husbands. . . .89 
This line of analysis suggests that, for Beardian reasons, John 
Adams was deaf to his wife’s principal claim, since it was precisely 
the legally mandated dependence of wives on “the unlimited 
power . . . of the husbands”90 it was Abigail’s chief purpose to see 
dissolved in a new code of laws. Instead, for John Adams, two 
wrongs seem to have made a right—women’s legally mandated 
dependence helped justify their exclusion from political power, 
 87. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan, supra note 50. Sullivan had written 
to Gerry, in a letter transmitted to Adams, “Every member of Society has a Right to give 
his Consent to the Laws of the Community or he owes no Obedience to them.” Id. Adams 
drafted his response within two months of having been prompted by his wife to “remember 
the ladies.” 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams, supra note 4, at 121.  
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rather than their exclusion from political power calling into 
question their legally mandated dependence.91 
Abigail Adams’s main concern was not voting rights, but a 
substantive code of law more just and favorable to women. She 
did, however, tell John that, should the laws not improve, the 
ladies “are determined to foment a rebellion, and will not hold 
ourselves bound by any laws in which we have no voice or 
representation.”92 Objection on behalf of women to their 
exclusion from democratic deliberation has a very long history,93 
as does the claim that they should not be bound by unequal laws 
from whose framing they were excluded. There is actually a tale 
in Boccaccio’s The Decameron in which a woman named 
Madonna Filippa is taken in adultery and serves very effectively 
as her own lawyer, making good use of quod omnes tangit before 
the magistrate and the men and women of her town. Confessing 
to adultery, she adds, 
I am certain you know that the laws should be equal for both 
sexes and made with the consent of those who are to obey 
them. That is not so in this case, for it only touches us poor 
women, who are yet able to satisfy many more than men can; 
moreover, no woman gave her consent or was even consulted 
when this law was passed. And so it may reasonably be called 
 91. Compare John Adams’s proposed response to the disenfranchisement of 
propertyless men, in his letter to Sullivan, supra note 50. (“Power always follows 
Property. . . . The only possible Way then of preserving the Ballance of Power on the side 
of equal Liberty and public Virtue, is to make the Acquisition of Land easy to every 
Member of Society: to make a Division of the Land into Small Quantities, So that the 
Multitude may be possessed of landed Estates. If the Multitude is possessed of the Ballance 
of real Estate, the Multitude will have the Ballance of Power, and in that Case the 
Multitude will take Care of the Liberty, Virtue, and Interest of the Multitude in all Acts of 
Government”). 
 92. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams, supra note 4, at 121. While she 
repeats that she “threat[ened] fomenting a Rebellion in case we were not consider[ed], and 
assured him we would not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we had neither a 
voice, nor representation” in her letter to Mercy Otis Warren detailing John Adams’s 
“sau[c]y” response to her “List of Female Grievances,” Abigail Adams also tells Warren, 
“I think I will get you to join me in a petition to Congress,” a far less revolutionary 
approach.” See Letter from Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, supra note 8. 
 93. Consider Ockham’s Dialogus, in which Magister repeatedly suggests women are 
part of omnes. See, e.g., WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS, Book 6, Chapter LXXXV in 
AUCTORES BRITANNICI MEDII AEVI, (John Kilcullen et al., eds.), available at 
https://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/ockdial.html. Kenneth Pennington in A Note to 
Decameron 6.7: The Wit of Madonna Filippa, 52 SPECULUM 902, 903-04 (1977), asserts first 
that the maxim’s “logic was never extended to women in the Middle Ages,” then goes on 
to acknowledge that Ockham’s “magister declares that women should not be excluded 
from a general council, especially in matters of faith ‘quae omnes tangit’” but observes that 
“the student responds that he cannot take such an irrational argument seriously” and 
concludes that “Ockham meant to amuse his readers with the irony of this passage.”  
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an inequitable law. . . . The case concerning so well known a 
lady had attracted to the Court almost all the inhabitants of 
Prato . . . [who] with one voice shouted that the lady was right 
and spoke well. Before they separated, with the judge’s consent 
they modified this cruel law.94 
Let me conclude that it is long past time to adopt the approach of 
Madonna Filippa and of Abigail Adams in considering whether 
originalism makes sense in general, but particularly from the 
perspective of women, their rights and liberties. 
 
 94. BOCCACCIO, 2 DECAMERON, Day 6. Tale 7, at 33-35 (Richard Aldington trans., 
1969).  
 
